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a b s t r a c t
We study two generalised stable matching problems motivated by the current matching
scheme used in the higher education sector in Hungary. The first problem is an extension
of the College Admissions problem in which the colleges have lower quotas as well as the
normal upper quotas. Here, we show that a stable matching may not exist and we prove
that the problem of determining whether one does is NP-complete in general. The second
problem is a different extension in which, as usual, individual colleges have upper quotas,
but, in addition, certain bounded subsets of colleges have common quotas smaller than the
sum of their individual quotas. Again, we show that a stable matching may not exist and
the related decision problem is NP-complete. On the other hand, we prove that, when the
bounded sets form a nested set system, a stable matching can be found by generalising, in
non-trivial ways, both the applicant-oriented and college-oriented versions of the classical
Gale–Shapley algorithm. Finally, we present an alternative view of this nested case using
the concept of choice functions, and with the aid of a matroid model we establish some
interesting structural results for this case.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The College Admissions (or Hospitals/Residents) problem was introduced by Gale and Shapley [10]. They gave a linear
time algorithm that always finds a stable matching. Roth [19] discovered that the very same method had already been
implemented in 1952 in the National Resident Matching Program, the centralised matching scheme that coordinates junior
doctor recruitment in the US. Since then, similar matching schemes have been organised in many countries to allocate
graduating medical students to hospital posts (hence the alternative name for the problem), and these matching schemes
are widely used for other professions as well. Gusfield and Irving [12] and Roth and Sotomayor [22] provide the classical
results and background material for this problem.
Regarding the original context, the Gale–Shapley algorithm is also used in handling higher education admissions in a
number of countries, including Spain [18], Turkey [4] and Hungary [5] (whilst a different method is used for medicine and
related subjects in Germany [7]). Moreover, the same kinds of admission systemhave been introduced for secondary schools
in, amongst others, Boston [2], New York [1] and again Hungary [5].
We define the College Admissions problem (ca) as follows. We are given a bipartite graph G(A ∪ C, E), where A =
{a1, a2, . . . , an} is the set of applicants and C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} is the set of colleges. If an applicant ai applies to a college cj
and cj finds ai acceptable then (ai, cj) ∈ E. Every applicant has a strict order of preference over the colleges he/she applies to,
and every college also has a strict order of preference over its acceptable applicants, so each applicant ai and each college cj
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has a preference list, denoted by P(ai) and P(cj), respectively. Furthermore, each college cj has a positive integer quota q(cj),
this being the maximum number of applicants that it can accept.
Amatching is a set of edges in the graph, such that every applicant is matched to at most one college and no college has
more assignees than its quota. For amatchingM , if an applicant ai ismatched inM then letM(ai) denote the college towhich
ai is assigned, and let M(cj) denote the set of applicants assigned to college cj. A matching is stable if, for every acceptable
applicant–college pair (ai, cj) that is not in the matching, either ai is matched and he/she prefersM(ai) to cj, or cj has a full
quota of applicants that it prefers to ai. In this case, we say that the pair (ai, cj) is dominated byM . An applicant and a college
form a blocking pair if it is not dominated by the matching.
Admission to higher education establishments in Hungary has been organised by a centralised matching scheme since
1985. The applicants submit a preference list over the particular courses of study they are interested in. In addition to the
name of the institution and the field of study, they have to indicate whether they are applying for state-financed or privately
financed study,1 but here, we consider these entities simply as distinct colleges for simplicity.
It is essentially the Gale–Shapley algorithm that is used each year to produce a matching that is stable in a certain sense,
and that involves more than 100,000 students. However, there are at least three special features in the scheme that are also
interesting in a theoretical sense.
The first feature,whichwas studied in [5], is the presence of ties in the system. The colleges rank their applicants according
to their academic scores and/or their results in the entrance exams; the solution is based on the concept of so-called stable
score-limit. This is equivalent to a stable matching if there are no ties, i.e., if two students cannot have the same score at the
same college.
The second feature, which is the subject of Section 2 of this paper, is the condition of lower quotas. In addition to upper
quotas, which are part of the classical College Admissions problem, here, every college may have a lower quota as well, that
is the minimum number of students that must be admitted if the college is to be open. We will show that a stable matching
may not exist in this case; moreover, the problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists is NP-complete in general.
We also mention some relaxed versions of this problem, and we describe the current heuristics used in the Hungarian
application. Here we note that, in a recent paper [13], Hamada et al. studied a related problem with similar motivations.
The difference between their model and ours is that they assume that each applicant has a complete preference list (i.e., the
underlying bipartite graph is complete) and they also require the matching to satisfy all lower quotas (i.e., no college can
be closed in their model). They proved that the problem of finding a matching with the minimum number of blocking pairs
under these conditions is NP-hard (moreover it is not approximable within n1−ε for any positive constant ε).
The third feature, studied in Sections 3–5, is the problem of common quotas. In this case, in addition to the individual
quotas of the colleges, particular sets of colleges can have common quotas smaller than the sum of their individual quotas.
This means that the number of students assigned to colleges in a given set cannot exceed the common quota for that set.
A solution is said to be stable if, for every acceptable applicant–college pair (ai, cj), if ai is not admitted to cj then either ai
is admitted to a preferred college, or cj has a full quota of better applicants, or there is a set of colleges Ck such that cj ∈ Ck
and the common quota of Ck is filled by better applicants than ai. (This implies that all of the colleges in the set Ck judge the
students on the same basis — i.e., have preference lists that are consistent.) In Section 3, we show that a stablematchingmay
not exist under these conditions, and that it is NP-complete to determine whether one does. On the other hand, we show
in Section 4 that, for nested set systems, the problem becomes solvable in polynomial time. We describe applicant-oriented
and college-oriented Gale–Shapley-type algorithms that find stable matchings, which we prove to be optimal/pessimal for
the applicants and colleges, respectively. Finally, in Section 5, we study the problem from the perspective of choice functions
and present some results on the structure of stable matchings that follow from an appropriate matroid model.
2. Lower quotas
In Hungary, higher education institutions can declare lower quotas for each of their particular areas of study. If the
number of assigned students is less than this quota for a particular area then the course has to be cancelled for that year. In
general, this creates an interval that ensures a reasonable number of students every year in order to make the course viable.
For some specialist areas of study this lower quota may be very small. In this section, we consider the complexity of the
College Admissions problemwith lower quotas. We prove that, for a given instance of this problem, a stable matching need
not exist and deciding whether one does exist is NP-complete.
2.1. Problem definition
Suppose we are given an instance of the College Admissions problem in which, in addition to its (upper) quota, each
college cj ∈ C has a lower quota l(cj). In the presence of lower quotas, to avoid ambiguity we refer to q(cj) as defined
previously as cj’s upper quota, also denoting q(cj) by u(cj). We assume that l(cj) ≤ u(cj) for all cj ∈ C .
1 An applicant may rank first a state-financed course of study in economics at university A, then secondly another state-financed course of study in
economics at university B, and thirdly a privately financed course of study in economics at the first university A. So the fee status is included in the
preferences of the applicants in this way.
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A matching in this context requires that every college cj satisfies |M(cj)| = 0 or l(cj) ≤ |M(cj)| ≤ u(cj). We say that
cj is closed if |M(cj)| = 0, and open otherwise. If |M(cj)| < u(cj), then we say that cj is undersubscribed; otherwise, if
|M(cj)| = u(cj), then we say that cj is full.
A matching is stable if the following two conditions are satisfied:
(a) (no blocking pair) there is no open college cj and applicant ai such that (ai, cj) ∈ E, cj is either undersubscribed or prefers
ai to a member ofM(cj), and ai is either unmatched or prefers cj toM(ai);
(b) (no blocking coalition) there is no closed college cj (blocking college) and a set of l(cj) applicants, each of whom is either
unmatched (and finds cj acceptable) or prefers cj to his/her assigned college.
Let ca-lq denote the problem of deciding whether an instance of the College Admissions problemwith lower quotas admits
a stable matching.
For a given instance of ca, each college admits the same number of applicants in all stable matchings, by the so-called
‘‘Rural Hospitals’’ theorem, first proved by Gale and Sotomayor [11]. Therefore, if every college achieves its lower quota for
an instance of ca, then the set of stable matchings remains the same in the corresponding ca-lq instance as well. To show
this, it is enough to see that a college that achieves its lower quota in a stable matching for the ca instance would be a
blocking college, if closed, in anymatching that has no blocking pair for the corresponding ca-lq instance. However, if some
college does not achieve its lower quota in the stable matchings for the ca instance then a stable matching may not exist for
the ca-lq instance, as we show by the following example.
2.2. An unsolvable instance
Example 1. We have two applicants, a1, a2, and two colleges, c1, c2, whose preference lists are given below. In this example,
and henceforth throughout this section of the paper, in the preference list of a given college cj, the integers following the
first and second colons are l(cj) and u(cj), respectively.
P(a1) : c1 c2
P(a2) : c2 c1
P(c1) : 2 : 2 : a1 a2
P(c2) : 1 : 1 : a1 a2
Here, one college must be closed, since we have only two applicants and the sum of the lower quotas is three. If c2 is closed
and M(c1) = {a1, a2} then (a2, c2) is a blocking coalition. Suppose now that c1 is closed. If M(c2) = {a2} then (a1, c2) is a
blocking pair. Otherwise, ifM(c2) = {a1} then c1 is a blocking college with {a1, a2}.
2.3. Complexity results
Wenowprove that ca-lq is NP-complete. To do so,we reduce from theNP-complete problem comsmti [16]. This problem
is defined as follows: we are given an instance I of the stable marriage problem [10] with n men and n women, where
preference lists may include ties and may be incomplete (i.e., a given person may not find all members of the opposite
sex to be acceptable). In this context a matching is a set of mutually acceptable (man, woman) pairs such that no person
appears in more than one pair. A matchingM is stable if there is no mutually acceptable (man, woman) pair, each of whom
is unmatched or prefers the other to his/her partner inM . The question is whether I admits a complete stable matching, i.e.,
a stable matching of size n. com smti is NP-complete, even if each man’s list is strictly ordered, and each woman wj’s list is
either strictly ordered or is a tie comprising two men, at least one of whom rankswj in first place [16, Theorem 2].
Theorem 1. ca-lq is NP-complete, even if no upper quota exceeds 3.
Proof. The problem is clearly in NP. To show NP-hardness, we reduce from the NP-complete restriction of com smti as
described above. Let I be an instance of this problem, in which U = {m1, . . . ,mn} is the set of men, andW = {w1, . . . , wn}
is the set of women. LetW0 ⊆ W be the set of women whose preference list in I is a tie of length 2. We create an instance
I ′ of ca-lq as follows. Every man in I corresponds to an applicant in I ′, and every woman inW\W0 corresponds to a college
with lower and upper quota 1 in I ′; the preference lists of these entities in I ′ are initially identical to the corresponding
preference lists in I . Now letwj ∈ W0 and suppose that the twomenmj,1 andmj,2 are tied inwj’s list in I . In I ′ we create two
colleges w1j and w
2
j , and two additional applicants a
1
j and a
2
j . The preference lists of these applicants and colleges, and the
lower and upper quotas of these colleges, are as follows:
P(a1j ) : w2j w1j P(w1j ) : 3 : 3 : a1j mj,1 a2j
P(a2j ) : w1j w2j P(w2j ) : 3 : 3 : a2j mj,2 a1j
Finally, we replace wj by w1j in mj,1’s list in I
′, and similarly we replace wj by w2j in mj,2’s list in I ′. We claim that I has a
complete stable matching if and only if I ′ has a stable matching.
To see this, suppose that I has a complete stable matchingM . Create a matchingM ′ in I ′ as follows. Initially letM ′ = M .
Suppose that (mi, wj) ∈ M ′ for some woman wj ∈ W0, where mi = mj,r for some r ∈ {1, 2}. Replace (mi, wj) in M ′ by
(a1j , w
r
j ), (a
2
j , w
r
j ) and (mj,r , w
r
j ). It may be verified thatM
′ is a stable matching in I ′.
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Conversely, suppose thatM ′ is a stable matching in I ′. Create a matchingM in I as follows. Initially, letM = M ′. Suppose
that (mj,r , wrj ) ∈ M ′ for some r ∈ {1, 2}, where mj,r = mi for some mi ∈ U . Then {(a1j , wrj ), (a2j , wrj )} ⊆ M as l(wrj ) = 3.
Replace (a1j , w
r
j ), (a
2
j , w
r
j ), (mj,r , w
r
j ) inM by (mi, wj). It is clear thatM is a matching in I , since the lower quotas imply that
at most one of w1j , w
2
j can be open, for each wj ∈ W0. Moreover, the stability of M ′ in I ′ implies that, for each wj ∈ W0,
exactly one ofw1j ,w
2
j is open, since at least one ofmj,1,mj,2 rankswj in first place in I . Hence it follows thatM is a complete
stable matching in I . 
2.4. Heuristics and relaxed problems
At the beginning of Section 2, we noted that lower quotas are specified by higher education institutions in Hungary for
the areas of study that they offer. However, the results of the previous subsection indicate that the problem of finding a
stable matching (if one exists) in such a context is hard. In this subsection we briefly describe the heuristics that are used in
Hungary to cope with the complexity of this problem. These heuristics themselves motivate some variants of ca-lq, whose
complexity we also consider here.
In the heuristics currently in use in Hungary, a generalised version of the Gale–Shapley algorithm is used several times.
After each run, one college is closed and the Gale–Shapley algorithm is called again for the reduced instance until all the
remaining colleges achieve their lower quotas. The college to be closed is selected from those colleges that have not reached
their lower quota. Moreover, the chosen college is one for which the ratio of the number of assigned applicants to the lower
quota is minimum.
Although this natural heuristic gives a matching that is stable for the remaining open colleges, there may still be a
blocking college. This motivates a relaxed variant of the problem, where we omit the second stability condition and forget
about blocking colleges.We refer to the resulting (weaker) stability criterion as pairwise stability. A pairwise stablematching
always exists; a natural question is to maximise the number of assigned applicants. Let max-ps-ca-lq denote the problem
of finding a maximum size pairwise stable matching for an instance of ca-lq.
Furthermore, let I be an instance of ca-lq. Define a college ci in I to be popular if |M0(ci)| ≥ l(ci), where M0 is a stable
matching2 in the instance I ′ of ca obtained from I by disregarding the lower quotas. College ci is unpopular otherwise. As a
third variant of ca, in a given instance I of ca-lq we can try to find a pairwise stable matchingM in I , such that no popular
college is closed inM . Such amatchingM in I is called a popular pairwise stable matching. A popular pairwise stablematching
always exists in I , and in fact the heuristic described above will find such a matching. So here, again we can consider the
problemof finding amaximumpopular pairwise stablematching in I , denoted bymax-pop-ca-lq. This problem is a restricted
version ofmax-ps-ca-lq, since we have the extra requirement that no popular college can be closed. Alsomax-pop-ca-lq is
a more general variant of ca-lq, because in the latter problem, unpopular colleges can be blocking.
In our corresponding technical report [6] we show that the decision problems related to both max-ps-ca-lq and max-
pop-ca-lq are NP-complete, even if each lower and upper quota is equal to 3. However, we remark that the complexity of
all of the above three problems, namely ca-lq,max-ps-ca-lq andmax-pop-ca-lq, remains open for lower quotas at most 2.
3. Common quotas: hardness results
Until 2007, in the Hungarian matching scheme, there were separate quotas for state-financed and privately financed
courses of study in each field at each university, and the common quotas of fields applied to state-financed places only. As
from 2007, there has been a common quota for each field at each university, and still a common national quota for state-
financed places for each field of study.3 This latter casemay cause difficulties, because a stablematchingmay not exist in this
setting, as is shown in Example 2. The main result in this section is that the problem of deciding whether a stable matching
exists, given an instance of the College Admissions problem with common quotas, is NP-complete.
3.1. Problem definition
For an instance of ca, we return to using the symbol q to represent (upper) quotas, so we have q : C −→ N. For
C ⊆ C ⊆ 2C , let C be a set system of colleges, comprising the so-called bounded sets of colleges. We extend the domain
of q to include every Ck ∈ C; let q(Ck) be the common quota of Ck.
A matching with respect to common quotas is a matching of the ca instance in which no bounded set of colleges has
more assignees than its common quota. A matching M is stable if, for every acceptable applicant–college pair (ai, cj) /∈ M ,
either ai is matched and he/she prefers M(ai) to cj, or cj fills its quota with better applicants than ai, or there is a bounded
set of colleges Ck such that cj ∈ Ck and the common quota of Ck is filled by better applicants than ai. To make the definition
2 By the Rural Hospitals Theorem [11], each college has the same number of assignees in the stable matchings of a given ca instance.
3 For example, for CS studies at Budapest University of Technology and Economics (BME) there were 450 places for state-financed study and 50 places
for privately financed study, whilst there was a common quota of, say, 3000 places for state-financed CS studies in Hungary. Since 2007, there has been
only a common quota of 500 for CS studies at BME and still the same national quota for state-financed CS studies.
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meaningful, there has to be a preference list for every bounded set of colleges, which we consider as amaster list. That is, we
suppose that the following two conditions hold (where P(Ck) denotes the preference list of bounded set Ck):
• if ci ∈ Ck and aj ∈ P(ci) then aj ∈ P(Ck), and conversely, if aj ∈ P(Ck) then there must be a college ci ∈ Ck such that
aj ∈ P(ci);
• if ci ∈ Ck then ci prefers aj to another applicant ar if and only if Ck prefers aj to ar .
We note that it is a consequence of the second bullet point that there is some consistency regarding the preferences of
bounded sets with common colleges, namely, if Ck∩Cl 6= ∅ then an applicant aj precedes another applicant ar in the master
list of Ck if and only if aj precedes ar in Cl’s master list.
We denote the decision problem of determining whether a stable matching exists for an instance of ca with common
quotas by ca-cq.
3.2. An unsolvable instance and complexity results
Firstwe give an example to show that a stablematchingmaynot exist, and another example forwhich the sets of admitted
applicants differ in two stable matchings. By using these examples as gadgets, we will prove that ca-cq is NP-complete.
Example 2. We are given three applicants, a1, a2, a3, four colleges, c1, c2, c3, c4 and two sets of colleges, {c1, c2}, {c2, c3}, with
common quotas. In this example, and from this point onwards, the integer after the first colon in the preference list of each
college (and each set of colleges) denotes the (common) quota. The preference lists and the quotas are as follows:
P(a1) : c1 c4
P(a2) : c2
P(a3) : c4 c3
P(c1) : 1: a1
P(c2) : 1: a2
P(c3) : 1: a3
P({c1, c2}) : 1: a2 a1
P({c2, c3}) : 1: a3 a2
P(c4) : 1: a1 a3
Here, no stable matching exists. To see this, suppose for a contradiction that M is a stable matching. If a1 is unmatched
then (a1, c4) is blocking. Otherwise, ifM(a1) = c1 then it must be the case that (a3, c4) ∈ M , but then (a2, c2) /∈ M because
of the quota of {c1, c2}, so (a2, c2) is blocking. Finally, ifM(a1) = c4 then (a3, c3) ∈ M , otherwise this pair would be blocking.
But this implies that (a2, c2) /∈ M , so (a1, c1) is blocking, a contradiction.4
Finally, we remark that if we remove a2 from the instance, then it becomes solvable, since {(a1, c1), (a3, c4)} is a stable
matching. We will use this fact in the proof of Theorem 2 below.
Example 3. We are given four applicants, a1, a2, a3, a4, six colleges, c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6 and four sets of colleges, {c1, c2},
{c2, c3}, {c4, c5}, {c5, c6}, with common quotas. The preference lists and the quotas are as follows.
P(a1) : c1
P(a2) : c5 c2
P(a3) : c3 c6
P(a4) : c4
P(c1) : 1: a1
P(c2) : 1: a2
P(c3) : 1: a3
P({c1, c2}) : 1: a2 a1
P({c2, c3}) : 1: a2 a3
P(c4) : 1: a4
P(c5) : 1: a2
P(c6) : 1: a3
P({c4, c5}) : 1: a2 a4
P({c5, c6}) : 1: a3 a2
Here, there are precisely two distinct stable matchings, {(a1, c1), (a2, c5), (a3, c3)} and {(a2, c2), (a3, c6), (a4, c4)}. To see
this, it is enough to observe that both a2 and a3 must be matched in a stable matching, since either (a2, c2) or (a3, c6)would
be blocking otherwise. Under this restriction, only the above two maximal matchings are possible, and it is easy to check
that both of them are stable. This example shows that the sets of admitted applicants may differ for two stable matchings.
Theorem 2. ca-cq is NP-complete, even if every quota is 1 and no college is included in more than 2 bounded sets.
Proof. The problem is clearly in NP. To show NP-hardness, we reduce from the NP-complete restriction of com smti
as described in Section 2.3. Let I be an instance of this problem, in which U = {m1, . . . ,mn} is the set of men, and
W = {w1, . . . , wn} is the set of women. Let W0 ⊆ W be the set of women whose preference list in I is a tie of length
2. We create an instance I ′ of ca-cq, with applicant set A and college set C , as follows.
First, we create the so-called proper part of I ′. Every manmi ∈ U in I gives rise to an applicant ai ∈ A, and every woman
wj in W\W0 gives rise to a college cj in C with quota 1; the preference lists of these agents in I ′ are derived directly from
the corresponding preference lists in I , except that a woman inW0 appearing in the preference list of a manmi gives rise to
a college in the preference list of applicant ai as described below. Now let wj ∈ W0 and suppose that the two menmj,1 and
4 We note that this situation can be realised in the Hungarian application. Colleges c1 and c2 can correspond to privately financed and state-financed
versions of a particular field of study at some faculty with a common quota, whilst c3 can correspond to state-financed study in the same area (e.g., the
Swahili language) at another faculty, with a common national quota for c2 and c3 , respectively. Finally, c4 can be any other field of study in some different
faculty.
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mj,2 are tied in wj’s list in I . In I ′ we create a gadget corresponding to the instance of Example 3. We create two additional
applicants, b1j , b
2
j , and six colleges, c
1
j , c
2
j , c
3
j , c
4
j , c
5
j , c
6
j , where four sets of colleges {c1j , c2j }, {c2j , c3j }, {c4j , c5j }, {c5j , c6j } have
common quotas with the following preferences:
P(b1j ) : c
5
j c
2
j
P(b2j ) : c
3
j c
6
j
P(c1j ) : 1: aj,1
P(c2j ) : 1: b
1
j
P(c3j ) : 1: b
2
j
P({c1j , c2j }) : 1: b1j aj,1
P({c2j , c3j }) : 1: b1j b2j
P(c4j ) : 1: aj,2
P(c5j ) : 1: b
1
j
P(c6j ) : 1: b
2
j
P({c4j , c5j }) : 1: b1j aj,2
P({c5j , c6j }) : 1: b2j b1j
Let A1 = {ai : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, A2 = {b1j , b2j : wj ∈ W0}. Finally, in the position where wj appears in the list ofmj,1 we put c1j
in aj,1’s list, and similarly the occurrence ofwj in the list ofmj,2 leads to c4j in aj,2’s list. We show that I has a complete stable
matchingM if and only if the proper part of I ′ has a stable matchingM ′ in which every applicant ai ∈ A1 is matched to some
college. This natural correspondence is the following. Whenever (mi, wj) ∈ M , with wj ∈ W \W0, let (ai, cj) ∈ M ′, and for
everywj ∈ W0 let
(mj,1, wj) ∈ M ⇐⇒ {(aj,1, c1j ), (b2j , c3j ), (b1j , c5j )} ∈ M ′
and
(mj,2, wj) ∈ M ⇐⇒ {(aj,2, c4j ), (b2j , c6j ), (b1j , c2j )} ∈ M ′.
It is straightforward to verify that the completeness and stability ofM implies the stability ofM ′ and ensures thatM ′ covers
every applicant ai ∈ A1.
In the other direction, ifM ′ is a stable matching that covers every applicant ai ∈ A1, then it must be the case that either
{(aj,1, c1j ), (b2j , c3j ), (b1j , c5j )} ⊆ M ′, or {(aj,2, c4j ), (b2j , c6j ), (b1j , c2j ) ⊆ M ′ for every pair of applicants aj,1 and aj,2 such that
mj,1 and mj,2 are tied in the list of wj for some wj ∈ W0. This is because exactly one of the pairs (aj,1, c1j ), (aj,2, c4j ) must
belong toM ′. They cannot both belong toM ′ for stability reasons, and if neither of them were to belong toM ′ then, because
both (aj′,1, c1j′ ) and (aj′,2, c
4
j′ ) cannot belong toM
′ for any other wj′ ∈ W0,M ′ could not cover every ai ∈ A1, a contradiction.
Therefore we can create M from M ′ in the opposite direction from that described, so the correspondence (between the
matchings of I and I ′ with the required properties) is one-to-one, the stability of M ′ implies the stability of M and the
assumption thatM ′ covers every ai ∈ A1 implies the completeness ofM .
To complete the reduction, we construct the additional part of I ′ as follows. For every ai ∈ A1, we add a gadget which is
equivalent to the instance defined in Example 2. To be precise, for every ai ∈ A1, we create two applicants, z1i , z2i , and four
colleges, d1i , d
2
i , d
3
i , d
4
i , with common quotas for the sets of colleges {d1i , d2i } and {d2i , d3i }. The preference lists and the quotas
are as follows.
P(z1i ) : d
1
i d
4
i
P(z2i ) : d
4
i d
3
i
P(d1i ) : 1: z
1
i
P(d2i ) : 1: ai
P(d3i ) : 1: z
2
i
P({d1i , d2i }) : 1: ai z1i
P({d2i , d3i }) : 1: z2i ai
P(d4i ) : 1: z
1
i z
2
i
Finally, we attach d2i to the end of ai’s preference list. We claim that I has a complete stable matching if and only if I
′
has a stable matching. To prove this, we observe that, on the one hand, in any stable matching for I ′, every ai ∈ A1 must be
matched to a college in the proper part of I ′, since otherwise the corresponding additional gadget would contain a blocking
pair, as described in Example 2. On the other hand, if every ai ∈ A1 is matched to a college in the proper part of I ′, then this
matching can be extended to the additional part, ensuring stability, by adding {(z1i , d1i ), (z2i , d4i )} to the matching in each
gadget, as we remarked in Example 2. 
4. Common quotas: nested set systems
We say that the set system C is nested if, for every pair S, S ′ of sets in C such that S ∩ S ′ 6= ∅, we have either S ⊆ S ′ or
S ′ ⊆ S. In this section, we consider a special case of ca-cq in which the bounded sets form a nested set system.
The Student–Project Allocation problem (SPA), studied by Abraham et al. [3], is such a special case of ca-cq. In SPA,
students seek to be matched to projects, and each project is proposed by a single supervisor. In addition to a quota for each
project (typically 1), each supervisor has a quota, so the projects proposed by a given supervisor form a bounded set. It is
immediate that the bounded sets form a nested set system in this case.
We note that the bounded sets formed a nested set system in the Hungarian application until 2007, because each faculty
had separate quotas for state-financed and privately financed studies and the common quota of any particular field of study
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while (there is an applicant awho is unmatched
and who has not applied to all of his/her acceptable colleges) {
c = the first college on a’s preference list to which he/she has not applied;
if (c is free)
assign a to c;
else {
let S be the critical set of c;
if (a is preferred, on the master list of G(c), to the
worst applicant bwho is assigned to a college in S) {
let d be the college to which b is currently assigned;
remove (b, d) from the matching; // i.e., b is rejected by d
add (a, c) to the matching;
}
else
a is rejected by c;
}
}
Fig. 1. Applicant-oriented algorithm.
applied to state-financed places only. In this section, we give two polynomial-time algorithms for ca-cq with nested set
systems. The first algorithm is applicant oriented and the second is college oriented; these produce stable matchings that
are, in the first case, unequivocally optimal for the applicants, and in the second case, in a more limited sense that will be
explained in Section 4.3, optimal for the colleges.
4.1. Definitions
We suppose that each set consisting of a single college is bounded (by its quota), and we assume that each bounded set
S of colleges of cardinality greater than 1 has a quota that is less than the sum of the quotas of any sets in C that form a
partition of S (otherwise S would be redundant as a bounded set.) A group is a maximal bounded set, i.e., a bounded set that
is contained in no other. So the assumption that bounded sets are nested implies that the groups form a partition of the set
of colleges. We denote by G(c) the group containing the college c. If S ⊂ S ′ and there exists no bounded set S∗ satisfying
S ⊂ S∗ ⊂ S ′, then S is a child of S ′ and S ′ is the parent of S, the terminology reflecting the tree-structured hierarchies of
bounded sets.
Let S ∈ C. For a given matching M , M(S) denotes the set of assignees of the colleges in S. Recall that M(a) denotes
the assigned college of applicant a (M(a) is null if a is unassigned). Relative to M , a bounded set S is full if the number of
applicants assigned to colleges in that set, |M(S)|, is equal to the quota of the set, q(S); otherwise, it is undersubscribed. A
college is free if no set containing it is full, and is constrained otherwise. So a free college can admit at least one additional
applicant without violating any quota restrictions. For a constrained college c , let the critical set of c relative toM , denoted
by csM(c), be the innermost, i.e., minimal with respect to⊆, full bounded set that contains c . A constrained college can admit
an additional applicant only if another applicant is rejected by some college in its critical set. The concepts free, constrained
and critical set are defined also, in the obvious way, for any bounded set.
As observed in Section 3.1, it is implicit in the definition of stability that colleges in a given group have consistent
preferences over applicants. Hence we assume that associated with each group is a strictly ordered master preference list
containing all the applicants who are acceptable to at least one college of that group. The preference list of a college c is
inherited from the master preference list of G(c).
4.2. Applicant-oriented algorithm
In the applicant-oriented algorithm each applicant applies to the colleges on his/her preference list, in turn, as in the
classical Gale–Shapley algorithm. In a step of the algorithm, when applicant a applies to college c , the outcome depends
initially on whether c is free. If so, c (provisionally) accepts a. Otherwise, amust compete for a place at c. The applicant who
may be displaced by a is not necessarily currently assigned to c. Let S be the critical set of c in M . If a is preferred, on the
master list of G(c), to the least preferred assignee b of some college d in S then b is rejected by d, enabling a to be accepted
by c. Otherwise c rejects a. As usual, this process continues until every applicant is either assigned, or has been rejected by
every acceptable college.
A pseudocode version of the algorithm appears in Fig. 1.
Lemma 3. (i) If a college c becomes constrained at some point during execution of the applicant-oriented algorithm, then it is
never again free.
(ii) If M is amatching inwhich c is constrained, andM ′ is thematching obtained after the subsequent step of the applicant-oriented
algorithm, then the least preferred assignee of csM ′(c) cannot be worse than the least preferred assignee of csM(c).
P. Biró et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 411 (2010) 3136–3153 3143
Proof. (i) At any point when c has a critical set S, the only way that S can become undersubscribed is as a result of the
rejection by some college in S of an existing assignee a. If this leaves S undersubscribed, it must be because some superset
S ′ of S is full, and the rejection of awas because a college in S ′ \ S gained a new more highly ranked assignee. So c remains
constrained (by S ′).
(ii) We first observe that if S ⊂ S ′ then it is immediate that the worst assignee of S is at least as highly ranked as the worst
assignee of S ′ (in the appropriate master list).
Suppose that, in the relevant step of the algorithm, applicant b applies to college d. If b is rejected then the matching
remains the same, so that the result holds trivially. On the other hand, if d accepts the application of b, let S be the critical
set of c in matching M , i.e., csM(c) = S, and let S ′ = csM ′(c). We denote csM(d) by T , when d is constrained, and consider
four cases.
Case (a) dwas free or T ∩ S = ∅. In this case it is easy to see that S = S ′ andM(S) = M(S ′), so the result follows at once.
Case (b) T ⊂ S. Then c 6∈ T , otherwise the fact that T is full would contradict the assumption that S = csM(c). Hence
csM ′(c) = S. The transformation fromM toM ′ affects only colleges in T , soM(S) \M(T ) = M ′(S) \M ′(T ). Furthermore, the
lowest-ranked applicant inM ′(T )must be ranked more highly than the lowest ranked applicant inM(T ). It follows that the
lowest-ranked applicant inM ′(S)must be ranked at least as highly as the lowest ranked applicant inM(S).
Case (c) T = S. Here, we have |M(S)| = |M ′(S)| = q(S), and the worst applicant in M ′(S) is ranked more highly than the
worst applicant inM(S). In this case, it is possible that S ′ ⊂ S, but then, by our first observation, theworst applicant inM ′(S ′)
is ranked at least as highly as the worst applicant inM ′(S), and therefore, is ranked more highly than the worst applicant in
M(S).
Case (d) S ⊂ T . If the rejected applicant was not in M(S) then it is immediate that S = S ′ and M(S) = M(S ′). Otherwise,
it must be the case that |M ′(S)| < |M(S)| and also |M ′(S∗)| < |M(S∗)| for every S∗, where S ⊂ S∗ ⊂ T and d /∈ S∗.
Furthermore, for every S∗ such that S ⊂ S∗ ⊂ T and d ∈ S∗, |M ′(S∗)| = |M(S∗)| < q(S∗), implying that S ′ = T . Since S ′
was the critical set of d, and its worst assignee, who was also the worst assignee of S, was rejected, it follows that the worst
applicant inM ′(S ′) is ranked more highly than the worst applicant inM(S). 
It is straightforward to verify that both parts of Lemma 3 are true, not only for a single college c , but for any bounded set
S of colleges.
Theorem 4. (i) The matching M found by the applicant-oriented algorithm is stable.
(ii) In M, each applicant has the best assignment possible in any stable matching.
Proof. (i) Suppose that M is not stable, and that (a, c) is a blocking pair. Then a must have been rejected by c during the
execution of the algorithm. So, at that point, c was constrained and the worst assignee b of its critical set must be ranked
higher than a on the master list of G(c). By Lemma 3, c remains constrained in the subsequent steps of the algorithm and
the worst assignee of its critical set can never be ranked lower than b, and hence not lower than a, a contradiction.
(ii) Now suppose that (a, c) ∈ M , and that there is another stable matchingM ′ with (a, c ′) ∈ M ′, where a prefers c ′ to c. So
(a, c ′) is a stable pair, i.e., a pair that is matched in some stable matching, and c ′ must have rejected a during the execution
of the algorithm. Assume, without loss of generality, that this was the first rejection involving a stable pair.
Let X be the matching at the point in the algorithm just before a college c∗ received an application from an applicant a∗
that resulted in the rejection of applicant a by college c ′. Let S = csX (c∗) and let X∗ = X ∪ (a∗, c∗), i.e., X∗ is the matching
X augmented with the additional pair (a∗, c∗). We will show that there exists an applicant b and a college d such that
• d = X∗(b), and
• b 6∈ M ′(d), and
• either d is free inM ′ or S ⊆ csM ′(d).
To see this, first we note that |M ′(S)| ≤ q(S) = |X(S)|. Moreover, |X∗(S)| = q(S) + 1, since the quota of S is exceeded
after adding the new pair, and |X∗(Si)| ≤ q(Si) for each Si ⊂ S, since S = csX (c∗), so that S is the innermost set for which
the quota is exceeded. This implies that one of the children of S, say S2, satisfies |M ′(S2)| < |X∗(S2)| ≤ q(S2). By the same
reasoning, we can construct a sequence of sets S = S1 ⊃ S2 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Sk = {d} such that, for every i, Si+1 is a child of
Si and Si satisfies |M ′(Si)| < |X∗(Si)| ≤ q(Si). Finally, let b be any applicant from X∗(d) \ M ′(d). By the construction, it is
straightforward to verify that b and d satisfy the required conditions.
Now, we are in a position to complete the proof. We first note that bmust be more highly ranked than a, for otherwise d
would have rejected b instead of c ′ rejecting a. Hence, if b is unmatched inM ′ or prefers d toM ′(b) then, since S ⊆ csM ′(d),
it follows that (b, d) is a blocking pair for M ′. On the other hand, if b prefers M ′(b) to d then b must have been rejected by
M ′(b) earlier than awas rejected by c ′, a contradiction. 
Corollary 5. All executions of the applicant-oriented algorithm yield the same stable matching.
Complexity analysis
We now establish that the complexity of the applicant-oriented algorithm is O(kL + pn), where L is the number of
acceptable (applicant, college) pairs, k is the maximum level of nesting of bounded sets, n is the number of applicants and p
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while (some group G of colleges is undersubscribed,
and contains a free college with an untried applicant) {
let (c, a) constitute the leading offer at this point;
mark a as a ‘tried’ applicant for c;
if (a is unassigned)
add (a, c) to the matching;
else if (a prefers c to his/her current assigned college d) {
remove (a, d) from the matching; // d is rejected by a
add (a, c) to the matching;
}
else
a rejects c;
}
Fig. 2. College-oriented algorithm.
is the number of bounded sets. The first term comes from the fact that themain loop of the algorithm is executed O(L) times,
and, as we establish below, with the exception of updating worst assignees, every step within the loop can be implemented
to run in O(k) time. The second term represents the total amount of time for updating worst assignees.
We represent the bounded sets by a forest structure F in which each node corresponds to a bounded set. Each individual
college is a leaf node, and the parent of a node representing the bounded set C is the node representing the parent of C .
For each individual college c and bounded set C create a Boolean value, accessible in constant time, that records whether
c belongs to C . We assume that the number of colleges is O(n), and that the data is provided in a form that allows these
structures to be set up in O(pn) time.
For each college, maintain a pointer to the leaf node representing it. In each node of F , representing, say, the bounded set
C , we store
• a pointer to its parent, to allow us to move up the tree;
• the (common) quota of C;
• the number of applicants currently assigned to colleges in C;
• a pointer to the preference list of the group containing C , and aworst assignee pointer, which references the last entry in
that list representing an applicant who is currently assigned to a college in C .
For efficiency reasons, we adopt a ‘lazy’ approach to updating the worst assignee pointer. We ensure that it is accurate
whenever the bounded set in question is full, since it is only in these circumstances that the pointer is needed. It is initialised
to point to a dummy entry at the end of the relevant master list.
To determine whether a college c is constrained, and if so to find its critical set, it is enough to follow the path of parent
pointers from the leaf node representing c until a node is reached for which the number of assignees is equal to the quota,
or until the root of the tree is reached without this condition being satisfied. This can be done in O(k) time.
When a pair (a, c) is added to, or deleted from, the matching, follow the path from the leaf representing c to the root,
incrementing or decrementing the number of assignees at each node, as appropriate. This can be achieved in O(k) time.
If the bounded set C represented by a node becomes full as a result of incrementing the number of assignees, the worst
assignee pointer is updated. By the analogue of Lemma 3(ii) for an arbitrary bounded set, the worst assignee of C must be
at least as good as the last time C was full, so this update can be accomplished by scanning backwards in the appropriate
master preference list, from that former worst assignee, until we reach an applicant assigned to a college in C . Because of
the initalisation of the worst assignee pointer, this works also in the case where C becomes full for the first time. For each
node in the forest, each entry in the appropriate master list is visited at most once during such scans, so the total time for all
such updates is the sum, taken over all trees in the forest, of the number of nodes times the length of the master list, which
is O(pn).
4.3. College-oriented algorithm
The college-oriented algorithm is a little more subtle. As we would expect, the basis is a sequence of offers from colleges
to applicants. Each college cmakes offers to applicants in the order in which they appear in themaster list of G(c), and never
makes an offer to the same applicant twice. As always, when an applicant receives an offer, he/she (provisionally) accepts it
if he/she is unmatched at that point, otherwise he/she accepts it if and only if it is a better offer than the one he/she currently
holds.
At each step of the algorithm an offer is initiated by an undersubscribed group G that contains a free college with an
untried applicant (i.e., an applicant to whom it has not yet offered a place). Let a be the highest ranking applicant in the
master list of G who is an untried applicant for some free college in G. Among these free colleges, let c be the one most
preferred by a; then c offers a place to a at that point. We say that the pair (c, a) constitutes the leading offer at that point.
A pseudocode version of the algorithm appears in Fig. 2.
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To establish the correctness of this algorithm, we again refer to the hierarchical forest of bounded sets, identifying each
bounded set with the node representing it.
The following technical lemma is used in the proof of Theorem 7.
Lemma 6. If, at some step during the execution of the algorithm, a college d in group G offers a post to an applicant b, and (a)
some other superior applicant a is not offered a post by a college c in G, where a is not marked as a ‘tried’ applicant for c, or (b) b
is not offered a post by a preferred college c, where b is not marked as a ‘tried’ applicant for c, then c must be constrained, and its
critical set at that point is not on the path from d to the root of the tree.
Proof. The fact that c must be constrained is straightforward from the definition of the leading offer. Furthermore, since d
is a free college, there cannot be any full bounded set on the path from d to the root of the tree (so no critical set either). 
Now we can establish the key properties of the college-oriented algorithm.
Theorem 7. (i) The matching M produced by the college-oriented algorithm is stable.
(ii) If an applicant a is matched to a college c in M then there is no stable matching in which a is unmatched, or matched to a
college lower on his/her preference list, i.e., M is the applicant-pessimal stable matching.
(iii) If a college c is matched to applicants a1, . . . , ak in M, then there is no applicant more highly ranked than any of a1, . . . , ak
who is matched to c in any stable matching.
Proof. (i) Suppose that M is not stable, and that it is blocked by an applicant a and college c . Then c cannot have offered a
place to a, because applicants can only improve as the algorithm progresses, so this would contradict the assumption that
(a, c) is a blocking pair forM . It follows that c must have a critical set, say S, on termination of the algorithm.
If (a, c) is a blocking pair then there is some college d in S and some applicant b who is assigned to d in M such that
either b is inferior to a, or b is equal to a and a prefers c to d. If b is inferior to a then it might be the case that d is equal to c .
However, in this case it is easy to see the contradiction, because when c offered a place to b, c must have offered to the more
preferred applicant a, and hence amust be eventually matched to a college at least as good as c . Suppose now that d is not
equal to c and b is the worst assignee of S (where b could be equal to a). Let P denote the path from the node representing
d to the root of the tree containing it. It is immediate that the node representing S lies on P . Further, letQ denote the path
from the node representing c to the node representing S.
At the step when d offered a place to b, it follows from Lemma 6 that c ’s critical set must have been a descendant node of
S not on P , say T . LetM∗ denote the matching at the point just before d offered a place to b. Since d is free inM∗, it follows
that every node on P is undersubscribed, implying in particular that |M∗(S)| < q(S). On the other hand, T is the critical
set of c inM∗, which implies that |M∗(T )| = q(T ). Further, letM ′ = M \ {(b, d)}. The fact that S is the critical set of c inM
implies that every node below S onQ, including T , is undersubscribed inM and therefore also inM ′, namely q(T ) > |M ′(T )|.
From the above observations, we have |M ′(S)| = q(S) − 1 ≥ |M∗(S)|. Let us consider the children of S. It must be the
case that either
(a1) there exists a child T1 of S such that T ⊂ T1 ⊂ S and |M∗(T1)| ≤ |M ′(T1)|, or
(b1) there exists a child S1 of S such that T 6⊆ S1 ⊂ S and |M∗(S1)| < |M ′(S1)|.
This is because if |M∗(T1)| > |M ′(T1)| holds for T1, where T1 is the child of S on the path from S to T , then there must be
some other child of S, say S1 (not on the path from S to T ), for which |M∗(S1)| < |M ′(S1)|. Note that T1 cannot be equal to T ,
since |M∗(T )| = q(T ) > |M ′(T )|.
In case (b1) we can construct a sequence of sets S ⊃ S1 ⊃ S2 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Sk = d∗ such that, for every i, Si+1 is a child of Si
and Si satisfies |M∗(Si)| < |M ′(Si)|. This means that d∗ is a free college inM∗ and d∗ has an assignee b∗ inM ′(S)\M∗(S)who
must be better than b (since b was the worst assignee of S in M), leading to a contradiction since d∗ should have offered a
place to b∗ at the point where d offered a place to b.
In case (a1) we use the same argument for T1 as we did for S. It must be the case that either
(a2) there exists a child T2 of T1 such that T ⊂ T2 ⊂ T1 and |M∗(T2)| ≤ |M ′(T2)|, or
(b2) there exists a child S1 of T1 such that T 6⊂ S1 ⊂ T1 and |M∗(S1)| < |M ′(S1)|.
As before, T2 cannot be equal to T .
Again, in case (b2) we can construct a sequence of sets S ⊃ T1 ⊃ S1 ⊃ S2 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Sk = d∗ leading to a similar
contradiction. On the other hand, in case (a2) we continue with the same reasoning for T2 leading to subcases (a3) and (b3),
and so on.
Continuing in this way, after at most j steps, where j is the length of the pathQ, we are led to an inevitable contradiction,
since case (a) cannot arise at the jth step.
(ii) Suppose that there is a stable matching M ′ in which a is unmatched, or is matched to a college lower than c on his/her
preference list. Suppose, without loss of generality, that, when c offered a post to a, this was the first time that an applicant
received an offer that was superior to his/her status in some stable matching. Call such an offer a superior offer. In order to
avoid (a, c) being a blocking pair forM ′, the critical set of c inM ′, say S = csM ′(c), must be full inM ′ with applicants ranked
more highly than a. Suppose that just before c offered a place to awe had a matchingM∗. Since c was free at that moment,
we have |M∗(S)| < |M ′(S)| = q(S). This implies that one of the children of S, say S2, satisfies |M∗(S2)| < |M ′(S2)| ≤ q(S2).
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By the same reasoning, we can construct a sequence of sets S = S1 ⊃ S2 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Sk = d such that, for every i, Si+1 is a
child of Si and Si satisfies |M∗(Si)| < |M ′(Si)| ≤ q(Si). Finally, let b be any applicant fromM ′(d) \M∗(d). It follows from the
construction that d is free in M∗ and that b is more highly ranked than a. So when c offered a place to a, bmust have been
matched to a college e in M∗ that he/she prefers to d. Therefore b had already received an offer from a college (e) that is
preferred to the college (d) he/she is matched to in the stable matchingM ′, which contradicts the assumption that c ’s offer
to awas the first superior offer.
(iii) Suppose that (a, c) is in M , and that (b, c) 6∈ M is in some stable matching M ′, with b more highly ranked than a.
Then, by part (ii), bmust prefer c toM(b) or b is unmatched inM , and it is immediate that (b, c) is a blocking pair forM , a
contradiction. 
The following is an immediate corollary of Theorem 7(ii).
Corollary 8. All executions of the college-oriented algorithm yield the same stable matching.
Note that Theorem7(iii) does not claim that, inmatchingM , each college has the ‘best’ set of assigned applicants that it can
have in any stable matching. This need not be true. For example, a college can be assigned a particular set A of applicants in
thematching found by the college-oriented algorithm, and a superset of A in some other stable matching. This also indicates
that, in contrast to the classical case, the number of applicants assigned to a college may vary between one stable matching
and another. These points are illustrated in the following example. (Despite this fact, we will use the term ‘‘college-optimal’’
for the matching obtained by a general kind of college-oriented algorithm in Section 5; however, the expression ‘‘applicant-
pessimal’’ is probably more accurate in this case.)
Example 4. Wehave five colleges ,c1, . . . , c5, and ten applicants, a1, . . . , a10. The bounded sets, in addition to the individual
colleges, are {c1, c2}, {c1, c2, c3} and {c4, c5}, so that the latter two are the groups, which we refer to as Group A and Group
B respectively. The preferences of the applicants, quotas of the bounded sets, and master lists of the groups are as shown:
P(a1) : c1 c5
P(a2) : c1 c4
P(a3) : c2 c1
P(a4) : c2 c4
P(a5) : c5 c3
P(a6) : c3 c4
P(a7) : c1 c4 c5
P(a8) : c2 c1
P(a9) : c4 c1
P(a10) : c2 c4 c5
q(c1) : 3
q(c2) : 3
q(c3) : 3
q(c4) : 2
q(c5) : 2
q(c1, c2) : 5
q(c1, c2, c3) : 7
q(c4, c5) : 3
P(c1, c2, c3) : a8 a9 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a10
P(c4, c5) : a4 a7 a9 a10 a5 a1 a2 a6
An execution of the applicant-oriented algorithm is as follows. Here, we use the notation a −→ c to stand for ‘applicant
a applies to college c ’.
a1 −→ c1; accepted.
a2 −→ c1; accepted.
a3 −→ c2; accepted.
a4 −→ c2; accepted.
a5 −→ c5; accepted.
a6 −→ c3; accepted.
a7 −→ c1; accepted.
a8 −→ c2; {c1, c2} is full; c1 rejects a7; c2 accepts a8.
a7 −→ c4; accepted.
a9 −→ c4; accepted.
a10 −→ c2; c2 is full; c2 rejects a10.
a10 −→ c4; c4 is full; c4 rejects a10.
a10 −→ c5; {c4, c5} is full; c5 rejects a5; c5 accepts a10.
a5 −→ c3; accepted.
The applicant-optimal stable matching results, namely
M1 = {(a1, c1), (a2, c1), (a3, c2), (a4, c2), (a5, c3), (a6, c3), (a7, c4), (a8, c2), (a9, c4), (a10, c5).
An execution of the college-oriented algorithm is as follows. Here, we use the notation c −→ a to stand for ‘the leading
offer is from college c to applicant a’.
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Group A undersubscribed; c2 −→ a8; accepted.
Group A undersubscribed; c1 −→ a8; rejected.
Group A undersubscribed; c1 −→ a9; accepted.
Group A undersubscribed; c1 −→ a1; accepted.
Group A undersubscribed; c1 −→ a2; accepted.
Group A undersubscribed; c2 −→ a3; accepted.
Group A undersubscribed; c3 −→ a5; accepted.
Group A undersubscribed; c3 −→ a6; accepted.
Group B undersubscribed; c4 −→ a4; accepted.
Group B undersubscribed; c4 −→ a7; accepted.
Group B undersubscribed; c5 −→ a7; rejected.
Group B undersubscribed; c5 −→ a10; accepted.
The applicant-pessimal stable matching results, namely
M2 = {(a1, c1), (a2, c1), (a3, c2), (a4, c4), (a5, c3), (a6, c3), (a7, c4), (a8, c2), (a9, c1), (a10, c5).
Note that colleges c1 and c2 have different numbers of assigned applicants in the two matchings. College c2, in particular,
has more assignees inM1 than inM2, though the additional assignee, a4, is lower ranked than the others, as must be the case
according to Theorem 7(iii).
Complexity analysis
The number of loop iterations isO(L), where L is the number of acceptable applicant–college pairs, since no collegemakes
more than one offer to the same applicant. At each loop iteration, we have to decide which college makes an offer to which
applicant. This can be decided by a traversal of the forest F of bounded sets. During this traversal, when we encounter a
node representing a bounded set that is full, we need not enter any of its subtrees, since no free college can thereby be
reached. When we reach a leaf node that represents a free college c , we can locate its next untried applicant a (if any), and
determine whether an offer from c to a is a better candidate for leading offer than any previously seen, all in constant time,
with suitable data structures. Also, as in the applicant-oriented algorithm, whenever a pair (a, c) is added to or removed
from the matching, we update the count of assignees in each node that is an ancestor of the leaf node representing c. Hence
each loop iteration can be completed in O(m) time, the time for the forest traversal, giving an overall time bound of O(mL)
for the college-oriented algorithm.
We saw earlier that the complexity of the applicant-oriented algorithm is O(kL+ pn), where k is the maximum level of
nesting of bounded sets, n is the number of applicants and p is the number of bounded sets. Since k = O(m), p = O(m) and
n = O(L), it follows that the complexity bound that we have derived for the applicant-oriented algorithm is at least as good
as that for the college-oriented algorithm.
5. ca-cqwith nested set systems: choice functions and a matroid model
From Example 4, it is clear that certain well-known properties of the classical College Admissions problem do not carry
over directly to the case of ca-cq with nested set systems; for example, that each college should have the same number of
assigned applicants in all stable matchings. However, it turns out that there are analogues of many of the structural aspects
of the classical problem. To investigate these, we adopt in this section a more general model based on choice functions
and matroids. Recall that G = (A ∪ C, E) denotes the bipartite graph with applicants and colleges as colour classes, and
acceptable pairs forming the set E of edges. In this section we work with the edges rather than the vertices of G, so for this
reason, for a set E ′ of edges and set V ′ of vertices (and for vertex v), E ′(V ′) (and E ′(v)) will denote the set of those edges of
E ′ that are incident with some vertex of V ′ (and with vertex v, respectively). In particular, ifM is a stable matching and Ci is
a bounded set, M(Ci) stands for all those edges with an end vertex that is a college in Ci. (Hitherto, by M(Ci) we meant the
corresponding set of applicants.)
5.1. Choice functions
We define two specific choice functions on the edge set E of G. A choice function on ground set E is a mapping Q that
assigns to each subset X of E a subset Q (X) of X . (Note that in the Economics literature choice functions are often defined in
a much more restrictive way; that is, Q is a preference-induced choice function on E if there is a (well-)order≺ on all subsets
of E such that Q (X) is the≺-minimal subset of X .) A subset X of E is called Q-independent if Q (X) = X .
The choice function of the applicants is denoted by QA, and for subset X of E, QA(X) is the set of those edges in X that the
applicants would choose if they could select freely from X , ignoring all quotas on the college side. Formally, every applicant
a that has at least one edge (application) in X chooses his/her most preferred edge from X , and QA(X) is the set of edges
selected in this way. An applicant-independent set of edges is a set X of edges for which QA(X) = X .
3148 P. Biró et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 411 (2010) 3136–3153
For the choice function QC of colleges, QC (X) denotes the set of edges that the colleges would accept if they could freely
select from X and could accept several edges from the same applicant. More precisely, subset QC (X) of X is determined by
the following algorithm. Order the bounded sets as C = {C1, C2, . . . , Cm} such that if Ci ⊆ Cj then i ≤ j holds. (In other
words, take a linear extension of the partial order on C given by set inclusion.) Let X0 := X , and for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m let Xi
denote the set obtained from Xi−1 after applying the quota of Ci. So Xi−1(Ci) is the set of edges of Xi−1 that are incident with
some college in Ci. Let X ′i denote the set of those edges of Xi−1(Ci) that are not amongst the best q(Ci) edges of this set. Now
let Xi := Xi−1 \ X ′i and let QC (X) := Xm. To construct X ′i , in addition to the quota q(Ci), we also need the preference order
on Xi−1(Ci). Although we have a preference order for Ci on the applicants (that is, for the vertices), here we need one on
the edges. The difference is that Xi−1(Ci)may contain several edges from the same applicant-vertex. We use the following
preference order: if two edges in Xi−1(Ci) correspond to different applicants then the original preference order of Ci is used.
To compare two edges from the same applicant, we use the applicant’s preference order. Therefore we have the following
partial order on the edges, denoted byE : an edge (a, c) ∈ E(G) is preferred to (b, d) ∈ E(G) if either applicant a is preferred
to applicant b by the bounded set containing both c and d or if a = b and college c is preferred to college d by applicant a.
We call subset X of E college independent if QC (X) = X . Note that in this case each bounded set Ci contains at most q(Ci)
edges from X .
Clearly, if X is a set of edges thenQA(X) = X if and only if each applicant has atmost one edge in X , andQC (X) = X holds if
and only if X satisfies all quotas ofC. Consequently, subsetM of E is amatching if and only ifM is both applicant independent
and college independent. Let edge (a, c) = e of E be an edge from applicant a to college c.We say that subset X of E dominates
edge e from the applicant side if e 6∈ QA(X ∪ {e}). This means that X contains an edge between some applicant-vertex a and
college-vertex c ′ such that a prefers c ′ to c. Subset X of E dominates edge e from the college side if e 6∈ QC (X ∪{e}). This means
that there is a bounded set Ci such that c ∈ Ci and QC (X ∪ {e}) contains q(Ci) different edges, each of which is better than
e according to the preference order of Ci. We say that subset X of E dominates subset Y of E from the college (applicant) side
and denote this fact by X C Y (X A Y ) if each element of Y \ X is dominated by X from the college (applicant) side.
Subset X dominates e if X dominates e from the applicant side or from the college side (or from both). If each edge of Y is
dominated by X then we say that X dominates Y . The above definitions are also valid for any arbitrary choice function Q on
E, in particular subset X of E Q -dominates subset Y of E (in notation X Q Y ) if X Q -dominates each element y of Y \ X; that
is, if y 6∈ Q (X ∪ {y}).
From these definitions, it is not difficult to see that a matching M is stable if and only if the set of those edges that M
dominates is E \M . That is, each edge outsideM is dominated byM , butM does not dominate any edge ofM; henceM is both
applicant independent and college independent. Edge e blocksmatchingM if e is not dominated byM . More generally, if G is
a bipartite graph with edge set E and colour classes C and A, and we are given choice functions QC and QA on E, then subset
M of E is a matching ifM = QC (M) = QA(M) holds; that is, ifM is both QA-independent and QC -independent. MatchingM
is stable ifM dominates all edges of E \M; that is, for any e 6∈ M , we have e 6∈ QC (M ∪ {e}) or e 6∈ QA(M ∪ {e}).
We show that our choice functions QA and QC have two important properties. A choice function Q on E is comonotone if
the mapping of unchosen elements X 7→ X \ Q (X) is monotone; that is, if X ⊆ Y ⊆ E implies that X \ Q (X) ⊆ Y \ Q (Y ), or,
in other words Q (X) ⊆ Q (Y ), where for choice function Q , Q (X) := X \ Q (X) denotes the unselected elements. Roughly
speaking, if some option x is ignored then it will still be ignored from a greater choice set. Choice function Q is increasing if
X ⊆ Y ⊆ E implies that |Q (X)| ≤ |Q (Y )|.
To justify the above properties for QA and QC , we prove that choice function QC is closely related to matroids. (The
interested reader is referred to the second volume of the book of Schrijver [23] that contains everything we need about
matroids.) We recall that subset E ′ of edges is college independent if each bounded set Ci contains at most q(Ci) edges from
E ′. Let IC ⊆ 2E denote the system of college-independent sets of edges.
Theorem 9. Set system IC forms the independent set of a matroid on set E of edges; that is,MC = (E, IC ) is a matroid.
Proof. Weuse induction on the numberm of bounded sets. Ifm = 1 thenwe have only one bounded set, and as each college
is a bounded set by itself, (E, IC ) is a uniform matroid of rank q(C1).
Form > 1, let C1, C2, . . . , Ck be the groups, that is, the inclusionwise maximal bounded sets. Let IC i denote the system
of those college-independent edge sets that only contain edges with college vertices from C i. If k > 1 then IC i forms the
independent set of amatroid by the induction hypothesis. This means that (E, IC ) is the direct sum of thesematroids; hence
it is a matroid, as we claimed.
On the other hand, if k = 1, that is, if C1 = Cm is the unique group, then let I′ denote the set of those edges that are
college independent for the set C1, C2, . . . , Cm−1 of bounded sets. By the induction hypothesis, (E, I′) is a matroid; hence its
q(Cm)-truncation (E, IC ) is also a matroid. 
Note that the proof of Theorem 9 also implies that ‘‘applicant-independent’’ subsets of edges (i.e., those subsets of the
edges that contain at most one application from each applicant) form a matroid. The reason is that these subsets can be
regarded as college independent where the bounded sets are the singletons and each quota is 1.
Observe that choice function QC always selects a college-independent set of edges. Moreover, for any set X of edges,
QC (X) has the property that it is an inclusionwise maximal college-independent subset of X: for each unselected element x
of X \QC (X) subset {x}∪QC (X) is not college independent, because there is some bounded Ci such that QC (X) contains q(Ci)
edges to Ci with the property that all of these q(Ci) elements are preferred to x.
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This observation has two consequences. On the one hand, |QC (X)| = rMC (X) is theMC -rank of X for any X . AsMC is a
matroid, rMC (X) ≤ rMC (Y )whenever X ⊆ Y . This implies that QC (and hence QA) is increasing.
On the other hand, the above observation means that QC (X) can be constructed by the greedy algorithm in the following
way. Fix a linear order e1, e2, . . . of E in such a way that if two edges, ei and ej, belong to the same bounded set then i < j
if and only if edge ei is preferred to ej (according to the partial order E). Let Ei := {ej : j ≤ i} and Xi := X ∩ Ei. The greedy
algorithm constructs each QC (Xi) in such a way that QC (X0) := ∅ and
QC (Xi+1) :=
{
QC (Xi) ∪ {ei+1} if QC (Xi) ∪ {ei+1} is independent
QC (Xi) otherwise.
To prove the comonotonicity ofQC , we have to show that if for edge x ofX wehave x 6∈ QC (X) then x 6∈ QC (Y )holdswhenever
X ⊆ Y . But this follows immediately from the greedy algorithm: an edge x is thrown away by the greedy algorithm during
the construction of QC (Z) if and only if x is spanned inMC by those elements of Z that precede x. So if x is not selected from
X then xwill not be selected from Y either, and this means that QC (and hence QA also) is comonotone.
Comonotone and increasing choice functions have some interesting properties. The following three statements, namely
Lemmas 10, 11 and Theorem 12, are well known in lattice theory. We include their proofs for the sake of completeness.
Lemma 10. If choice function Q on E is comonotone and increasing then
Q (X) ⊆ Y ⊆ X ⇒ Q (X) = Q (Y ) holds. (1)
Proof. If Q (X) ⊆ Y ⊆ X then Y \ Q (Y ) ⊆ X \ Q (X) by comonotonicity; hence Q (X) ⊆ Q (Y ). The increasing property of Q
implies that |Q (Y )| ≤ |Q (X)|, and with the previous relation this implies that Q (X) = Q (Y ). 
An important consequence of Property (1) is that, for any comonotone and path-independent choice function Q on E,
relationQ is a partial order on Q -independent subsets of E. We need the following useful lemma to prove this.
Lemma 11. If Q is a comonotone choice function with Property (1) on E and X and Y are subsets of E, then X Q Y (that is, X
dominates subset Y of E) if and only if Q (X ∪ Y ) = Q (X).
Proof. Assume first that X Q Y . For any y ∈ Y \ X , we have that y ∈ Q (X ∪ {y}); hence by monotonicity of Q it follows
that (Y \ X ⊆ Q (X ∪ Y ); that is, Q (X ∪ Y ) ⊆ X ⊆ X ∪ Y . Now Property (1) implies that Q (X) = Q (X ∪ Y ).
Suppose now that Q (X) = Q (X ∪ Y ) holds and let y ∈ Y \ X . Property (1) and Q (X) ⊆ X ∪ {y} ⊆ X ∪ Y yields that
Q (X ∪ {y}) = Q (X ∪ Y ) = Q (X); hence each element of Y \ X is dominated by X; that is, X Q Y . 
This observation allows us to prove thatQ is a partial order on Q -independent sets.
Theorem 12. If Q is a comonotone choice function with Property (1) on E, thenQ is a partial order on Q -independent subsets
of E.
Proof. For any subset X of E, we have Q (X) = Q (X ∪ X). This means that X Q X by Lemma 11; hence Q is reflexive.
Assume that X and Y are Q -independent E such that X Q Y and Y Q X hold. Lemma 11 shows that X = Q (X ∪ Y ) = Y .
This justifies the antisymmetry of Q . For transitivity, assume that X, Y and Z are Q -independent and X Q Y Q Z . This
means that Q (X ∪ Y ) = X and Q (Y ∪ Z) = Y by Lemma 11 and the Q -independence. Monotonicity of Q implies that
Z \ Y ⊆ Q (Y ∪ Z) and Y \ X ⊆ Q (X ∪ Y ); hence (Z \ Y )∪ (Y \ X) ⊆ Q (X ∪ Y ∪ Z); that is, Q (X ∪ Y ∪ Z) ⊆ X ⊆ X ∪ Y ∪ Z .
Now Property (1) of Q yields that Q (X ∪ Y ∪ Z) = Q (X) = X , and from Q (X ∪ Y ∪ Z) = X ⊆ X ∪ Z ⊆ X ∪ Y ∪ Z it follows
again by Property (1) that Q (X ∪ Z) = Q (X ∪ Y ∪ Z) = X; that is, X Q Z . SoQ is indeed a partial order on Q -independent
sets. 
So far in this section we have proved that the ca-cq problem with nested bounded sets can be formulated as a
stable matching problem with increasing comonotone choice functions. It is not difficult to see that if Q is an increasing
comonotone choice function then Q is path independent; that is, for any X and Y in the domain of Q we have Q (X ∪ Y ) =
Q (Q (X) ∪ Q (Y )). Roth proved the following theorem for preference-induced comonotone choice functions that are clearly
path independent [20,21].
Theorem 13. Assume that G = (A ∪ C, E) is a bipartite graph between sets A of applicants and C of colleges and edges of E
represent applications. If choice functions QC of colleges and QA of applicants are both comonotone with Property (1) then there
is a stable matching, that is, a subset S of E such that QA(S) = QC (S) = S and each edge e ∈ E \ S is dominated by S.
A possible proof of Theorem 13 is contained in [9], where a generalisation of the deferred acceptance algorithm is also
described. It is slightly different from the one we need later, so here we describe a proof and an algorithm.
Proof. If choice function Q is comonotone then Q is monotone by the definition of comonotonicity. Let us define function
F on subsets of E by F(X) := E \QA(E \QC (X)). First we prove a connection between stable matchings and fixed points of F .
Assume that S is a stable matching. Let SC := {e ∈ E : e ∈ QC (S ∪ {e}) denote the set of edges that S dominates from
the college side. By the stability of S, each edge in E \ (S ∪ SC ) is dominated by S from the applicant side. The monotonicity
of QC implies for S ′ = S ∪ SC that SC ⊆ QC (S ′); hence QC (S ′) ⊆ S ⊆ S ′ holds. By the Property (1) of QC this means
that QC (S ′) = QC (S) = S, where the latter equation comes from the fact that S is a stable matching, and hence college
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independent. In particular, QC (S ′) = SC holds. The above argument for choice function QA shows that QA(S ′′) = S, where
S ′′ = S ∪ SA and SA is the set of edges that S dominates from the applicant side. As S is a stable matching, each element
outside S ′ is dominated from the applicant side; hence Q (S ′′) = S ⊆ E \ SC ⊆ S ∪ SA = S ′′, and Property (1) of QA implies
that QA(E \ SC ) = QA(S ′′) = S; thus QA(E \ SC ) = (E \ SC ) \ S = E \ (SC ∪ S) = E \ S ′. So
F(S ′) = F(S ∪ SC ) = E \ QA(E \ QC (S ′)) = E \ QA(E \ SC ) = E \ (E \ S ′) = S ′
So each stable matching S determines a fixed point of F .
Now assume that F(S ′) = S ′ is a fixed point. By denoting QC (S ′) by S we have QC (S ′) = S ′ \ S. We show that S is a
stable matching. By Property (1) of QC , QC (S ′) = S ⊆ S ′ implies that QC (S) = QC (S ′) = S ,and for x ∈ S ′ \ S we have
Q (S ′) ⊆ S ∪ {x} ⊆ S ′, so QC (S ∪ {x}) = QC (S ′) = S; that is, S dominates each edge of S ′ \ S from the college side.
From F(S ′) = S ′ we get that
F(S ′) = S ′ = E \ QA(E \ QC (S ′)) = E \ QA((E \ S ′) ∪ S);
hence E \ S ′ = QA((E \ S ′)∪ S), or, in other words, S = QA((E \ S ′)∪ S). This means that for any element x of E \ S ′ we have
QA((E \ S ′)∪ S) = S ⊆ S ∪ {x} ⊆ (E \ S ′)∪ S, so Property (1) implies that S = QA(S ∪{x}). The conclusion is that S is a stable
matching.
In what follows we prove that F is monotone. If X ⊆ Y , then QC (X) ⊆ QC (Y ) follows by the monotonicity of QC ; thus
E\QC (X) ⊇ E\QC (Y ). Themonotonicity ofQA implies thatQA(E\QC (X)) ⊇ QA(E\QC (Y )); hence F(X) = E\QA(E\QC (X)) ⊇
E \ QA(E \ QC (Y )) = F(Y ) holds, proving that F is indeed monotone.
It follows that ∅ ⊆ F(∅) ⊆ F(F(∅)) ⊆ · · · is a chain of increasing sets. As ground-set E is finite, after some iterations we
find a fixed point S0 = F(F(. . . (F(∅)) . . .)) of F , such that S0 := QC (S0) is a stable matching. 
Actually, the set S0 we constructed at the end of the above proof is an inclusionwise minimal fixed point of F , because
if F(S∗) = S∗ is another fixed point then ∅ ⊆ S∗; hence F(∅) ⊆ F(S∗) = S∗, so F(F(∅)) ⊆ F(S∗) = S∗, and so on. In
other words, stable matching S0 dominates all those edges from the student side that some stable matching may dominate
from the student side; that is, each applicant receives the best assignment that he/she can have in a stable matching. In
other words, QC (S) is the so-called applicant-optimal stable matching in general. This is the solution that we constructed
also with the applicant-oriented algorithm in Section 4.2 for the particular choice functions of our model ca-cqwith nested
set systems.
Note that there is a college-optimal stable matching, as well. To construct it, we start the iteration of F with E, rather
than with ∅. So we get a decreasing chain F(E) ⊇ F(F(E)) ⊇ F(F(F(E))) . . . of subsets of E that stabilises at a fixed point
S1 = F(F(. . . F(E) . . .)) = F(F(. . . F(F(S1)) . . .)) = F(S1). This S1 is the inclusionwise maximal fixed point of F because
if F(S∗) = S∗ is another fixed point of F then from S∗ ⊆ E by monotonicity it follows that S∗ = F(F(. . . F(S∗) . . .)) ⊆
F(F(. . . F(E) . . .)) = S1. That is, if a stable matching dominates some edge e from the college side then e is certainly
dominated by stable matching S1 := QC (S1) from the college side. We call S1 the college-optimal stable matching. In
particular, for the special choice functions of ourmodel ca-cqwith nested set systems, this solution is the applicant-pessimal
stable matching that the college-oriented algorithm finds in Section 4.3.
How do we construct the above applicant- and college-optimal stable matchings? It is simple: we iterate function F
starting from E or from ∅. Let E0 := E and for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . let Ei+1 := F(Ei). As soon as Ei+1 = Ei, we can determine the
college-optimal stable matching S1 = QC (Ei). We know that E0 ⊇ E1 ⊇ · · · is a decreasing chain, so to construct Ei+1 from
Ei we have to find elements of Ei \ Ei+1 that we have to delete from Ei. From the formula Ei+1 := F(Ei) = E \QA(E \QC (Ei)) it
follows that Ei+1 = Ei \ QA(E \ QC (Ei)), so at the (i+ 1)th iteration we delete QA(E \ QC (Ei)) = QA(QC (Ei)∪ (E \ Ei)) from Ei.
Note that the iteration of F is not exactly the Gale–Shapley algorithm. The Gale–Shapley algorithm corresponds to the
recursive definition E ′i+1 := E ′i \ QA(QC (E ′i )). However, from Property (1) of QA and QC it is not difficult to prove that Ei = E ′i
holds for all i.
5.2. Structural results
Several interesting properties about the structure of stable matchings are known. Knuth [15] attributes to Conway
the observation that stable marriages have a lattice structure: if each man picks the better assignment out of two stable
matchings then another stablematching is created in which eachwoman gets theworse husband from the two. Using linear
programming tools, Teo and Sethuraman [24] proved a generalisation of this, namely, that if k stable matchings are given
and each man selects the lth best partner then a stable matching is created in which each woman receives her (k+ 1− l)th
husband. Later, this result was further generalised by Fleiner [8] for the many-to-many model and the proof was based on
the lattice property. Even later, Klaus and Klijn [14] found the same proof for the many-to-one case.
Another interesting consequence of the lattice structure is the ‘‘Rural Hospitals theorem’’ of Gale and Sotomayor [11],
stating that if in the college admissions problem some college c does not fill up its quota in a stable matching then college
c receives the same set of applicants in each stable matching. Our goal in this section is to extend the above properties
to the ca-cq problem. Note that the ‘‘natural’’ ca-cq extension of the ‘‘Rural Hospitals theorem’’ does not hold, as we saw
in Example 4. (There, college c1 is assigned a number of students equal to its quota in one stable matching but a smaller
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number in another one. The example also shows that, in contrast to the case of ca, in the ca-cq problem it is not true that in
the college-optimal stable matching each college gets the best set of students.)
Fleiner studied stable matching problems with comonotone set functions in [9]. Corollaries 26 and 27 of [9] yield the
following result.
Theorem 14. Assume that G = (A∪C, E) is a bipartite graph with colour classes C and A and thatMC andMA are two matroids
on E. Let QC and QAbe increasing comonotone choice functions on E that are defined by the greedy algorithm on matroidsMC and
MA respectively, for some linear orders.
(i) If M1,M2, . . . ,Mk are stable matchings then QC (
⋃k
i=1Mi) and QA(
⋃k
i=1Mi) are also stable matchings.
(ii) For any two stable matchings M and M ′, spanMC (M) = spanMC (M ′) and spanMA(M) = spanMA(M ′) hold.
Obviously, Theorem 14 holds for the ca-cq problem. But observe that it is more general than that. Theorem 14 is also true
if (say) applicants can be assigned to several colleges up to certain personal quotas, and there can be nested bounded sets
on the applicant side as well, just as for colleges. Theorem 13 implies that, for this case, too, there exists a stable matching,
and Theorem 14 concerns the structure of these stable matchings.
The first part of Theorem 14 implies our earlier observation on the applicant-optimal and college-optimal stable
matchings; namely, if X is the union of all stable matchings then MC := QC (X) and MA := QA(X) are stable matchings.
AsMC andMA dominate any other stable matching from the college side and from the applicant side, respectively, it follows
thatMC is the college-optimal stablematching andMA is the applicant-optimal one. This observation implies Theorems 4(ii),
7(ii) and (iii).
But the first part of Theorem 14 has an even more interesting consequence, as this generalises the lattice property of
stable marriages. If the colleges freely choose from the union of the edge sets of two stable matchings M1 and M2, then by
Theorem 14 another stable matching is created that we denote by M1 ∨ M2. Clearly, M1 ∨ M2 dominates both M1 and M2
from the college side. Moreover, if a stable matchingM dominates bothM1 andM2 from the college side thenM dominates
M1∪M2 from the college side; henceM also dominatesM1∨M2 from the college side. From this fact it follows thatM1∨M2
is the least upper bound ofM1 andM2 asC is a partial order on stable matchings by Theorem 12.
A similar proof shows that for stable matchingsM1 andM2 stable matchingM1 ∧M2 := QA(M1 ∪M2) is the least upper
bound ofM1 andM2 for partial orderA. The following lemma gives a relation the above two partial orders.
Lemma 15. Assume that G = (A∪C, E) is a bipartite graphwith colour classes A and C and thatMA andMC are twomatroids on
E. Let QA and QC be comonotone choice functions with Property (1) on E that are defined by the greedy algorithm onMA andMC ,
respectively, for some linear orders. Then for any two stable matchings M1 and M2 relation M1 A M2 is equivalent to M2 C M1,
or, in other words, partial ordersA andC are opposite on stable matchings.
Proof. IfM1 andM2 are stable matchings then each of themmust dominate the other one. IfM1 dominates each element of
M2 \M1 from the applicant side thenM2 must dominate each element ofM1 \M2 from the college side, and vice versa. The
lemma directly follows from this observation. 
Lemma 15 implies that partial order C forms a lattice on stable matchings with lattice operations ∨ and ∧: we have
seen thatM1 ∨M2 is theC -least upper bound andM1 ∧M2 is theA-least upper bound; hence by Lemma 15M1 ∧M2 is
theC -greatest lower bound ofM1 andM2.
The lattice structure of stable matchings allows us to prove an extension of the result of Teo and Sethuraman [24]. Our
proof is essentially the same as the one in [8] that has also been found by Klaus and Klijn [14] for the many-to-one case.
Theorem 16. Assume that the ca-cq problem is given by bipartite graph G = (A ∪ C, E) with colour classes A and C, a nested
system C of bounded sets and quotas q : C → N. Let M1,M2, . . . ,Mn be arbitrary stable matchings and 1 ≤ k ≤ n an arbitrary
integer. If each applicant chooses his/her kth best assignment out of the n assignments provided by stable matchings Mi, then the
set M of these edges is a stable matching.
Proof. Let each applicant a order the n stable matchings according to his/her preference as M1a ,M
2
a , . . . ,M
n
a such that a
prefersM1a the best andM
n
a the least. Let
M :=
∧
a∈A
Ma = QA
(⋃
a∈A
Ma
)
whereMa :=
k∨
i=1
M ia = QC
(
k⋃
i=1
M ia
)
.
Clearly M is a stable matching, and so is Ma for each applicant a, by Theorem 14(i). Observe that Ma dominates each of
M1a ,M
2
a , . . . ,M
k
a from the college side; henceMa is dominated by these matchings from the applicant side. This means that
inMa each applicant a′ of A receives his/her worst assignment out of his/her assignments inM1a ,M2a , . . . ,Mka . In particular,
applicant a receives his/her kth best assignment out of the ones given by M1,M2, . . . ,Mn. Any other applicant a′ gets the
kth best out of k assignments which is an assignment that is not better than the one represented byMka′ . AsM is constructed
by letting the applicants to choose from
⋃
a∈AMa, each applicant a will choose his/her kth best assignment represented by
Mka . That is,M is the stable matching described in the theorem. 
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The second part of Theorem 14 talks about the span on a subset of a matroid. Recall that an element e of some matroid
M is spanned by subset E ′ ofM if either e ∈ E ′ or there is an independent subset E∗ of E ′ such that any proper subset of
E∗ ∪ {e} is independent. This is equivalent to saying that the rank rM(E ′) of E ′ equals the rank rM(E ′ ∪ {e}); that is, in case
of (say)MC , we have |QC (E ′)| = |QC (E ′ ∪ {e})|. This latter formulation implies that if some stable matching M dominates
e from the college side then e ∈ spanMC (M). Recall that E ′(a), E ′(c) and E ′(Ci) denote the set of edges of E ′ that belong to
applicant a, to college c and to some bounded set of colleges Ci, respectively.
What does it mean that some set E ′ of edges spans a certain edge e in the ca-cq problem? Clearly, for matroid MA it
happens if and only if applicant-vertex a of edge e is incident with an edge (e or some other) of E ′, i.e., if |E ′(a)| ≥ 1. ForMC
this means that either e ∈ E ′ or there is a bounded set Ci containing c such that |E ′(Ci)| ≥ q(Ci). Recall that bounded set Ci is
full relative tomatchingM if |M(Ci)| = q(Ci), and otherwise Ci is undersubscribed. Recall that a bounded set is free if it is not
contained in a full bounded set. We call bounded set Ci weakly free relative to E ′ if no bounded set that properly contains Ci
is full relative to E ′. (In particular, a weakly free set relative to E ′ can be full relative to E ′.) Bounded set Ci is essential relative
to E ′ if Ci is weakly free and no bounded subset of Ci is full relative to E ′. (In particular, an essential bounded set cannot be
full relative to E ′.) We have the following generalisation of the ‘‘Rural Hospitals theorem’’.
Theorem 17. Let M be a stable matching in an instance of ca-cq. If bounded set Ci is weakly free relative to M then, for each
stable matching M ′, we have |M(Ci)| = |M ′(Ci)|. Moreover, if Ci is essential relative to M then M(Ci) = M ′(Ci).
In other words, if a bounded set is not properly contained in a full bounded set then it is incident with the same number of
edges in each stable matching. Moreover, if this bounded set does not contain a full bounded set then it is incident with the same
set of edges in each stable matching.
Note that Theorem 17 remains true if applicants also have a college-type choice function as the proof only uses
Theorem 14 and the structure of matroidMC .
Proof. Weprove Theorem17 by induction on i. (Recall thatwe fixed an order C1, C2, . . . of bounded sets such that a superset
always has a greater index.) If C1 is not weakly free relative toM then we have nothing to prove. If C1 is free (that is weakly
free and undersubscribed) relative toM then C1 is essential relative toM as C1 does not contain any other bounded sets. This
means that spanMC (M) ∩ E(C1) = M(C1). So ifM ′ is another stable matching then, by Theorem 14,
M(C1) = spanMC (M) ∩ E(C1) = spanMC (M ′) ∩ E(C1) = M ′(C1),
just as we claimed. Now suppose that C1 is full relative toM and assume for a contradiction that |M(C1)| 6= |M ′(C1)|. From
|M(C1)| = q(C1) ≥ |M ′(C1)|, it follows that |M ′(C1)| < q(C1); hence C1 is undersubscribed in stable matching M ′. But we
just have proved that in this case C1 cannot be full in any stable matching, a contradiction.
Now assume that Theorem 17 is true for each Cj with j < i and we prove it for Ci. If Ci is an inclusionwise minimal
bounded set then the proof is exactly the same as for C1 above. Otherwise, Ci = C1 ∪C2 ∪ · · ·∪Ck, where C1, C2, . . . , Ck are
the inclusionwise maximal bounded subsets of Ci that are disjoint by the nested property. Wemay assume that Ci is weakly
free relative toM , as otherwise we have nothing to prove.
Suppose first that Ci is undersubscribed relative M . Clearly, each of C1, C2, . . . , Ck is weakly free relative to M , so
Theorem 17 holds for them: |M(C t)| = |M ′(C t)| for any stable matchingM ′. But this means that
|M(Ci)| =
k∑
t=1
|M(C t)| =
k∑
t=1
|M ′(C t)| = |M ′(Ci)| .
If Ci is essential relative toM then all of C1, C2, . . . , Ck are also essential relative toM; hence
M(Ci) =
k⋃
t=1
M(C t) =
k⋃
t=1
M ′(C t) = M ′(Ci)
holds. This finishes the case when Ci is undersubscribed inM .
It remains to settle the casewhen Ci is full relative toM . If, indirectly, Ci is undersubscribed in some other stablematching
M ′, then the above argument also holds for M ′ instead of M . This yields in particular that Ci cannot be full relative to any
stable matching, contradicting the existence ofM . 
Theorem 17 is a genuine generalisation of the ‘‘Rural Hospitals theorem’’ as, in the absence of common quotas, each
college c is aweakly free bounded set by itself, so each stablematching assigns the samenumber of applicants to c. Moreover,
if college c does not fill up its quota in some stable matching then bounded set {c} is essential; hence c gets the same set of
applicants in each stable matching.
Actually, in the College Admissions problem each college is a group by itself. Interestingly, in the ca-cq problem groups
behave somewhat similarly to colleges in the College Admissions problem.
Corollary 18. If Ci is a group in the ca-cq problem then any stable matching assigns the same number of edges to Ci.
Proof. A group is weakly free by definition, so the corollary follows from Theorem 17. 
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5.3. Comparison between the direct and the matroid approaches
In Section 4, we constructed and studied two direct algorithms for solving the College Admissions problemwith common
quotas in the case of nested set systems, whilst in Section 5, we solved the same problem by a more general approach using
choice functions andmatroids. The readermightwonderwhy both descriptions are necessary. Here,wewould like to answer
this hypothetical question.
We proved the existence of a stable matching by each method, and we also showed that the two main variants of each
method produce the applicant-optimal and the applicant-pessimal solutions, respectively. This latter fact ensures that the
corresponding variants lead to the very same results. The reason for studying both methods, beside the obvious interest in
having both a direct and a general argument, is the following. On the one hand, the direct algorithms have complexities
which are not achievable by the general method. On the other hand, the structural results which are straightforward by the
matroid model would be difficult to prove directly. A further advantage of the general approach is that, as we noted, similar
results can be verified for such more general settings where the choice function on the applicants’ side is more complicated
than the one in our model.
We note that the original algorithm of Gale and Shapley [10] and its variant studied by McVitie and Wilson [17] have a
similar relation to each other as our general and direct method. Both produce the same results, but the O(L) running time is
achievable only with the latter variant, where the proposals are made one by one rather than simultaneously.
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